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Abstract
The nature of conflict around the world has changed since the end of World War II.
Since that time, there has been an increase in the number of intrastate conflicts, and
these conflicts have become more violent and deadly. Since many of them involve
questions of identity, the traditional methods of conflict resolution typically cannot be
applied. Many intrastate conflicts also involve third-party interventions which add
another dimension to the conflict. This paper will address the changing nature of
conflict and the rise of intrastate conflict and resolution by including explorations and
analysis of the conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The
analysis of these conflicts (including third-party interventions) will point to the
potential importance of mediation as a form of conflict resolution in identity conflicts
which involve ethnic tensions. Finally, this paper will end with a discussion of the
current conflict in Libya and an assessment of third-party interventions to date as well
as things to consider in searching for a resolution to the conflict.
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I

ntroduction

This paper has its roots in my study abroad experiences in Geneva, Switzerland
and London, United Kingdom. There I first came into contact with the field of conflict
resolution and became extremely interested in the area. One of the many things we
discussed during my time there was the issues surrounding intrastate conflict
resolution. While we were unable to delve into this are deeper during my studies, I chose
to write my paper for the class on the conflict in Cyprus, which to this day still remains
an issue. The more I researched the paper, the more I realized I could write forever on
the topic. This is what led to this thesis, my ever expanding interest in conflict
resolution.
Conflict exists all around us. We can hardly go a day without dealing with some
sort of conflict. On the global scale, the existence of conflict is no different. With scarce
amounts of resources, civilizations have battled to the death to determine access to these
resources. Dating back to the Spartans and Athenians, conflict is very much a part of
humanity. Over the years the methods of engaging in conflict and the tools used in
conflict have changed but conflict still remains. From the primal weapons of the past to
today’s nuclear arsenals, humans have come up with newer and deadlier tools to use in
3

conflict. This paper will focus on modern intrastate conflict, third-party interventions,
and conflict resolution with a focus on mediation.
Conflict, on the global scale, is characterized in two ways. Interstate conflict is
conflict that occurs between two autonomous nations or states. Interstate conflict
generally involves the militaries of the two states or nations fighting against each other,
however that is by no means universal. On the other hand, intrastate conflict is conflict
that occurs within the borders of a sovereign nation or state. Intrastate conflict typically
involves both state and non-state actors. State actors include government forces (i.e.
police forces) or military forces. Non-state actors can include terrorist organizations,
rebel groups, or insurgencies. While both inter and intrastate conflicts still occur, there
are some interesting trends now taking place.
Before the end of the Cold War, dating back to the Athenians and Spartans,
Greeks and Romans, interstate conflict appeared to be the most prevalent form of
conflict. Numerous examples can be found throughout history: World Wars I and II, the
Hundred Years War, the Austro-Hungarian wars, etc. These generally involved national
militaries fighting on the battle field. Today, there seems to be an increase in the
number of intrastate conflicts.
Levy documents the trends in the changes of conflict globally. “Between 1816 and
1945, there were 110 intrastate wars and 56 interstate wars. In the half century after
1945, when the number of states in the international system nearly tripled, there were
103 intrastate wars and 22 interstate wars” (Levy, 18-19). Why has this change
occurred? Can we trace the roots of this change? This will be addressed further on in
this paper.
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In order to highlight this deadly trend, this paper will examine the Rwandan civil
war and genocide as well as the Wars of Yugoslavian Secession. These case studies are
both modern examples of intrastate conflict. Both conflicts also involved cases of
genocide, which has been contested by some nations. These cases are also interesting
because of the intervention of third-parties. These case studies will help to highlight
what needs to be done to more effectively resolve intrastate conflict.
Another important aspect of intrastate conflict and its resolution is third-party
intervention. In our increasingly globalized world, it is difficult to not recognize the
interconnectedness of nations and states to each other. This has led many nations to
intervene either on their own behalf or on behalf of the warring parties. But what are the
most effective means of intervention, should third-parties intervene, and what can
third-parties do to be more effective? These questions will also be explored throughout
the paper with a focus on mediation as useful and effective way of resolving conflict.
A key player in terms of third-party intervention is the United Nations. Since its
creation following World War II, the UN seeks to bring the nations of the world together
into one forum for the discussion of international laws, support other nations, and
prevent conflict. Since the end of the War, it is evident that the UN has not been able to
prevent conflict. In fact, the UN may serve only to incite parties against each other and
create rivalries. The UN’s effectiveness has been called into question many times in the
past. In this paper, I will explore the role of the UN in our globalized world and more
importantly its role in the resolution of intrastate conflict.
With intrastate conflict become more deadly and more prevalent, the need for
conflict resolution has become ever more important. This paper seeks to place a
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capstone on the research that has already been completed in the area of intrastate
conflict resolution, as well as contribute original research. The paper will examine two
case studies, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, in order to give depth to this research. Using these
cases as well as other research on intrastate conflict, its resolution, and the importance
(or unimportance) or third-party interventions, will inform an assessment of the current
civil war occurring in Libya and what might be done to resolve the conflict in the interest
of preserving the most basic human right: the right to life.

6

L

iterature

R

eview

Executive Summary
There is much that has been written about the resolution of intrastate conflicts
over the years since the end of the Cold War. This research focuses on the different
approaches to ending intrastate conflict as well as the ability of third-parties to
intervene and work out settlements with the warring parties. Since the end of the Cold
War there has been an increase in intrastate wars, or wars that occur within a country,
as opposed to interstate conflicts which occur between nations or states. The goal of this
review is to look at the relevant research that has already been written regarding the
resolution of conflicts, particularly intrastate conflicts. From the research, it is clear that
more needs to be done in the area of resolving intrastate conflict, specifically regarding
the role of third-party interveners. Much of the research that has been done is purely
theoretical and in some instances bears little on the actual resolution of intrastate
conflict.
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Introduction
Modern conflicts have a new face. During and following the end of the Cold War,
there has been an increase in the number of intrastate or civil wars that have broken out.
Third-party intervention has become the subject of much research, as well as what the
role a third-party could and should play in negotiations. The research included in this
review aims at some of the research questions I plan to explore:
1. Why has there been a change in the nature of conflict from inter- to intrastate
conflict?
2. What is the role of other third-party interveners and mediators of intrastate
conflict, and how could the UN be more effective in conflict resolution?
3. What can the world learn about intra-state conflict and its resolution from the
Rwandan conflict as well as the Yugoslavian conflict?
4. How can we use the lessons from Rwanda and Yugoslavia to resolve the
current conflict in Libya?
Carment and Rowlands (1998) have developed a model that is helpful in determining
the abilities of large and small scale interventions by third-parties. Regan (2002)
discusses the connection between third party interventions as the duration of conflict.
Rothman and Olson (2001) argue that the focus on intervention should aim at the root
causes of a conflict, especially identity issues that typically arise in many intrastate
conflicts. Hartzell (1999) writes that while it is important to resolve underlying issues, it
is more important to have a concrete plan for reconstruction, including security
agreements. Arnault synthesizes previous research by evaluating agreements for their
characteristics. Arnault argues that some agreements are placed as the central means of
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ending a conflict while others are simply a step on the way to peace and need not be
followed to the letter. In 2004, the United Nations released a report from the High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change which focused a bit on the UN’s role in
intrastate conflicts.
Literature Review
Carment and Rowlands in their article “Three’s Company: Evaluating Third-Party
Intervention in Intrastate Conflict,” develop a game-theoretic model that attempts to
measure the abilities of different strategies to end an intrastate conflict. They state that
there is a relationship between the “salience of the intervener, the mission’s intensity,
the capabilities of the ascendant militia, and the ascendant militia’s expected gains from
continued fighting” (Carment, 573). The combination of these factors should influence
the decision of a third-party to intervene or to not intervene. For the authors, a third
party intervention can involve rather high costs as well as other risks, especially if
military forces are committed to action in the fighting (Carment, 576).
For their model, Carment and Rowlands apply a few assumptions. First,
“interveners in an intrastate conflict are presumed to be capable of making decisions on
a conflict according to coherent, well-ordered preferences” (577). Second, the thirdparty is able to specify its goals and objectives in intervention. For most third-parties,
the goal is humanitarian and focuses on stopping the violence as quickly as possible to
prevent further human suffering. Finally, the “consequences of action are as important
as their content” (Carment, 577). While the end result is important to the intervener,
what action is taken is also very important.
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There are also concerns that the third-party must take into account for its own
feasibility of resolving the conflict. If third parties are only enforcing self-accepted peace
agreements, it is easier for the third-party rather than attempting to force an agreement
between the parties. “Third-party intervention only works when the belligerents believe
that the third-party is there to enforce a settlement between ethnic groups into the
indefinite future” (Carment, 580-1). Again, third-parties must also take into
consideration the costs associated with committing military forces to a conflict, if that is
what they chose to pursue (Carment, 580-1).
The authors also make an important distinction between the use of small scale
and large scale interventions:
The intensity of the initial intervention affects the payoffs to both players. For the
combatants, resisting a low-intensity intervention involves lower costs than
resisting a high-intensity intervention. For the intervener, the cost of initiating
and maintaining an intervention rises with its intensity, although the increase in
cost associated with more aggressive operations is assumed to be relatively lower
for high-intensity interventions (Carment, 583).
This is a critical determinant that needs to be considered by the third-party. Depending
on the choice of intervention scale, the third-party would assume more or less risk, and
also commit more or less resources to resolving the conflict. The authors also claim that
the size of the intervening force can be changed (Carment, 582).
Given this background, the authors then move to a benchmark model from the
game. “The first obvious lesson that these benchmark games illustrate is that more
intensive interventions are more likely to result in cooperative outcomes. This result is
intuitively appealing and suggests that the model has some desirable features”
(Carment, 591). Small nations may not have the capability to do so, but could potentially
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be just as effective. The authors go on to state, “where the model may have more value is
in identifying those cases in which low-intensity interventions also generate desirable
solutions” (Carment, 591).
In his article, “Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate
Conflicts,” Regan discusses the misconception that the intervention of a third-party
leads to a shortening of a conflict. “Using a hazard analysis, the results suggest that
third-party interventions then to extend expected durations rather than shorten them”
(Regan, 1). The author argues that for an intervention to be successful, both sides must
recognize that the payoff of continued fighting is not worth the cost associated. Regan
goes on to discuss the differences associated with supporting rebel and state forces (59).
Overall, Regan argues that third-party support of rebel groups is more difficult
that supporting state forces “for reasons of logistical efficiency and international norms”
(61). While it is easier to support governments, the benefits associated with assisting
rebel groups are generally greater than interventions that support governments (Regan,
61). Whether a third-party intervention supports a rebel or government group, Regan
argues that the focus of a third-party intervention is conflict management. “Interveners
may prefer their ally to prevail, but one would think that prevailing at an acceptable cost
and in a reasonable time frame would be critical to an effective outcome” (Regan, 1).
Regan concludes that the idea that a third-party intervention actually shortens
the duration of an internal conflict is flawed. “The policy implications of these results
are fairly stark. If the objective of an intervention is to shorten the length of a civil
conflict, then an outside military or economic intervention is not a terribly effective
strategy to do so. Regardless of how the intervention is conceived- or empirically
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operationalized- there seems to be no mix of strategies that leads to shorter than
expected durations” (Regan, 72). While the author does not suggest a more effective tool
or mix, Regan’s contribution to the area of intrastate conflict resolution is important to
the understanding of intrastate conflict resolution.
Along the same lines, Rothman and Olson argue that there needs to be a new
emphasis in conflict resolution in their article, “From Interest to Identities: Towards a
New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution.” They argue: “An analysis of civil wars
illustrates the difficulty of applying traditional methods of negotiation and even the
more cutting-edge forms of ‘interest-based bargaining’ to identity-based conflict”
(Rothman, 290). According to the authors, civil wars are “much more likely than
interstate wars to contain major violence, thereby making resolution more difficult”
(Rothman, 290). As Carment and Rowlands argued, this is why third-party
interventions are mostly concerned with humanitarian goals. There is typically very
heated violence between the warring parties which can result in large amounts of
casualties as we have seen in a number of conflicts over the years.
Rothman and Olson discuss the number of different approaches that have been
researched and studied that could be applied and used in conflict resolution. “However,
until and unless underlying identity needs are surfaced and at least addressed in
principle, progress in finding new means for lasting peace in identity conflicts will
remain elusive” (Rothman, 292). While their research details the importance of the scale
of intervention, they do not account for how well the intervention can deal with the core
issues. Their research is based on whether or not the conflict has been resolved, which
may not always be the end of the conflict. As Rothman and Olson argue, not dealing
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with the underlying issues can have disastrous effects. “A tragic example is the 1995
Dayton Peace Accords, where the Bosnian conflict was ‘settled’ only to persist and reemerge with renewed virulence in Kosovo a couple of years later” (Rothman, 290). The
article also cites Licklider who researched and discovered that “negotiated settlements
have only rarely been able to end identity civil wars effectively. Of the 63 identity civil
wars during this period [(1945-93)], only nine were ended through negotiated
settlement” (Rothman, 290). Rothman and Olson argue that there are two types of
intervention that do not aim at the underlying problems, and support a form of
intervention that aims at identity issues.
The first is resource-based negotiation. In this form of intervention, the “bottomline” must be known, and each party knows what the other party hopes to gain either by
continuing the conflict or ending it (Rothman, 292). This issue with resource-based
negotiation is that it does not aim at the core problems in a conflict. “The danger of the
resource-based framing is that it leads to short-term, material ‘fixes’ that leave the
underlying conflict causes untouched” (Rothman, 292). In order to support their
argument, Rothman and Olson use the example of the Dayton Peace Accords. “This is
what occurred following the Dayton Peace Accords, as a negotiated power-sharing
arrangement provided Milosevic with the prestige and power to move into Kosovo. As in
the former Yugoslavia, conflicts can result that tend to recur with added intensity, and
each time a conflict recurs it becomes more difficult and threatening, and the cost of
resolution rises for both sides” (Rothman, 292).
The second form of intervention does slightly better than resource-based
intervention, but still fails to account for the major underlying issues. This second form
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is interest-based bargaining. In this intervention “a distinction [is made] between what
is sought and what motivated what is sought” (Rothman, 293). With this form, the
authors recognize that certain assumptions are made. “These include the assumption
that people will naturally pose their conflicts in competitive and zero-sum ways over
scare resources and incompatible positions” (Rothman, 293). Unlike resource-based
negotiation, interest-based bargaining seeks a sort of common ground between the two
sides.
The essence of interest-based conflict resolution is finding creative solutions that
satisfy each side enough to defuse the conflict. Moreover, unlike resource conflict,
in which a good settlement among neighbors is often accompanied by a good
fence, interest-based bargaining may lead conflicting parties to seek common or
superordinate goals as a basis for bridgebuilding [sic], ongoing cooperation, and
positive interdependence, thus breaking down some fences (Rothman, 293-4).
According to Rothman and Olson, interest-based bargaining is a step closer to dealing
with the underlying issues of conflict, but falls short of a final method: identity-based
conflict resolution.
Rothman and Olson argue that identity-based conflict resolution deals with the
key issues of a conflict and can also be important to stopping a conflict from recurring.
This type of intervention recognizes that there are fundamental differences between the
warring parties. “Deep conflict is viewed as emerging from perceived or actual
incompatibilities between the identities of disputants” (Rothman, 295). Because many
identity conflicts were not treated as such, Rothman and Olson argue that these conflicts
have a greater chance of recurrence. “Thus, we hypothesize that many conflicts that have
appeared ‘settled’ but have later reemerged with greater virulence are, in many cases,
conflicts whose true source has not been adequately articulated and engaged first”
(Rothman, 296). In one sense, this intervention can allow the warring parties to have a
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conversation about their core differences that they may not have done otherwise if the
conflict had not occurred (Rothman, 296). While Rothman and Olson argue that these
measures are invaluable to reaching a possible settlement to a conflict, Hartzell argues
that very few conflicts have actually been resolved by settlements.
While Rothman and Olson argue about the importance of focusing on identity
issues as a way of solving root issues, Hartzell argues that there should be more of a
focus on reconstruction. He believes this is because negotiated settlements are
somewhat ineffective. “In this article, I argue that the most important are those
elements that address the security concerns of the contending parties as they move from
the situation of anarchy and self-help that characterizes civil war to the reconstruction
of central state authority that characterizes the end of civil war” (Hartzell, 3). In
addition, the ending of a conflict signals the need for a reconfiguring of central authority
that can be agreeable to both parties, if a settlement is reached. While Hartzell does not
write this, it seems that this may also be important in conflicts that end because of an
outright winner. Although one party may have won in the struggle, it is still important
for the victors to be mindful of the needs of the “losers.” If not, there is a chance that the
war could be renewed later on when the defeated have had a chance to regroup.
“Emphasizing the dangers groups face as they demobilize, analysts have stressed the
importance of confidence-building measure meant to reassure opponents that, once
they disarm, a rival will not be able to take advantage of the settlement and score a
victory it was unable to achieve on the battlefield” (Hartzell, 7).
Whereas Rothman and Olson argue for the importance of dealing with identity
issues, Hartzell recognizes the necessity of creating the necessary security environment
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for the two parties to proceed into the future. “The data on civil war settlements indicate
that stable agreements ending civil wars can be produced through attention to the
development of institutions that address the security concerns of the contending
parties” (Hartzell, 18). It is vital, according to Hartzell, that third-party interveners
recognize this need when attempting to resolve a conflict. In terms of further analysis of
third-party interventions, Hartzell’s contribution falls short of indicating the necessity
or abilities of third-party interventions, as Carment and Rowlands have in their article.
“In the long run, a civil war settlement must be constructed on the basis of
institutions that address the security fears of groups in divided societies. Only by
constructing institutionalized settlements can civil war opponents act to neutralize the
security dilemma they face and facilitate the move by groups in society towards more
cooperative relations” (Hartzell, 20). As part of addressing the underlying issues in a
conflict, as Rothman and Olson argue, creating a stable security in the reconstruction
phase of a conflict is of vital importance not only for the warring parties, but also for any
third- party interveners.
As a sort of synthesis of these three previous articles, Jean Arnault provides
descriptions of different views of settlements and the role the settlement plays in
resolving the conflict. As Arnault writes: “There is more than one school of thought
when it comes to the role and importance of peace agreements within the overall
process of reaching the negotiated settlements of and internal conflict” (Arnault, 1).
Arnault’s contribution also analyzes the abilities of the United Nations, a major thirdparty with a mission to ensure world-wide security for member nations.
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The first view of settlements is the “constitutive” view. The constitutive “views the
substance of the peace agreement as key to the overall process, which will reflect its
strengths and weaknesses, virtues and shortcomings” (Arnault, 1). This view of
agreements places vital importance on the agreement itself including the wording,
ability to implement, as well as creating a timetable for the implementation of the
agreement. A few examples of this type of peace agreement are El Salvador on 12
January 1992 and Guatemala on 29 December 1996 (Arnault, 1). There is also a role for
third-parties in this form of agreement. “During the implementation phase, the
international community- the UN in these cases- becomes the guardian of the integrity
of the agreement as a referee and a source of positive and negative incentives for the
parties to comply faithfully with their undertakings” (Arnault, 1).
The second type of agreement is the “instrumental.” This form “does not ascribe
the same centrality to the agreement, whose negotiation is but one of the many stages in
a complex transition. It should therefore not be made to bear alone the burden of the
entire process” (Arnault, 1). Here, the agreement is not as important as is the resolution
of the conflict itself. In this sense, “concern over the agreement’s imperfections in terms
of working, feasibility, or legitimacy should be weighed against the paramount need to
maintain the momentum, of the overall transition” (Arnault, 1). In fact, Arnault argues
that the implementation of an agreement should not seek to follow the agreement to the
letter. Instead, the original agreement should be seen as a template that can be modified
given the situations that may be encountered. Arnault provides the example here as the
Burundi Peace Agreement on 30 August 2000 (Arnault, 1-2).
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Similar to other articles described in this review, Arnault also argues for the
importance of dealing with and solving root problems. “The first consideration is that
vital interest must be fully addressed within the negotiations and cannot be deferred to
the implementation stage in the hope that better conditions will then exist for their
resolution” (Arnault, 13). For third-party interventions in particular, it is important that
the third-party ensure that these underlying issues are resolved before moving into the
reconstruction phase.
The United Nations has also identified key issues in its role in intrastate conflict
moving forward with the release of its High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change in 2004. The UN walks a very fine line in dealing with intrastate conflicts.
In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the
privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever perceptions
may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of
State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to
protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider
international community. (21)
In the interest of collective security, the report argues that the international community
must “help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case
may be” (22). The report argues that there have been a number of successful
interventions by the UN, but also a number of failures. “The biggest failures of the
United Nations in civil violence have been in halting ethnic cleansing and genocide”
(34). One of the largest impediments to UN involvement, as the report states, is the
states themselves. “United Nations efforts to prevent outbreaks of internal violence have
met with less success than its efforts to prevent inter-State wars, and they are often
inhibited by the reluctance of Member States to see their domestic affairs
internationalized” (37). A few other measures are discussed in the report, but they will
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be discussed further on. Notwithstanding, the report urges that certain changes be made
and that the United Nations uses the powers that have been given to it in order to
maintain a collective security.
Conclusion
It is evident that much research has been done regarding theoretical applications
of resolving intrastate conflicts and most research gives concrete examples. Carment
and Rowlands focus on the decisions of third-party interveners to use small scale or
large scale interventions. Rothman and Olson argue for a focus on identity issues or
other underlying issues when attempting to resolve a conflict. This is especially
important for third-party interveners that are trying to resolve a conflict. Hartzell argues
that it is also important that settlements concentrate on post-conflict security
institutions. Arnault synthesizes the previous research by classifying the use of
settlements as constitutive or instrumental. It is important that future research focus on
analysis and proscription of third-party interventions as well as the abilities of thirdparties to resolve these conflicts, as the UN Report seeks to do. While this is an
important report, it may not go far enough. It seems that it is also necessary to put a sort
of capstone on this research which would include both conflict resolution as well as
post-conflict restructuring. While conflict resolution is important, if plans are not
implemented to deal with the important issues on both sides, the conflict could easily
break out again. A classic would be World War I. The Treaty of Versailles created harsh
conditions within Germany which led to the rise of Hitler and the Nazis. The Treaty, in
this case, created the atmosphere for the conflict to recur.
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I plan to bring all of this research and more into my thesis as well as to evaluate
the abilities of the United Nations in resolving intrastate conflicts and the role of other
third-parties. If the UN and other international organizations hope to contribute to the
end of intra-state conflict, it is important to know what their abilities and limitations
are. I hope to create a sort of capstone that covers both aspects of conflict resolution and
post-conflict restructuring. As I mentioned, the two are not mutually exclusive, but are
rather important to each other.
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Since the end of World War II in 1945, the nature of conflict has changed
significantly. The nations of the world have not been thrown into protracted conflicts
which span more than one continent. In fact, there has instead been a rise in the
number of conflicts that occur within countries, or intrastate. This does not mean that
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interstate wars have ceased to occur, rather that intrastate conflicts have become more
likely than interstate. Intrastate conflicts tend to be extremely fierce and violent which
creates a number of humanitarian issues. Unlike interstate conflict, intrastate conflict
provides some challenges in terms of third party intervention and conflict resolution
tactics. “Traditional methods of conflict resolution tend to be ineffective in dealing with
protracted social conflicts, because they do not deal with the structural inequalities of
the system or the deprivation of human needs through their focus basically on the
symptoms” (Rothman, 291). As Levy explains, wars have shifted away from the “great
powers” to “insurgencies and civil wars [which] involve loose coalitions of different
groups fighting for their own purpose” (Levy, 19). In order to understand what these
challenges are and how they might potentially be resolved, it is first important to
understand why there has been this change in the nature of conflict and what these
changes mean. I offer that there are four main points to consider when explaining the
rise of intrastate as opposed to interstate conflict: distribution of power, economic
integration, political integration, and democratization.
In his article, “International Source of Interstate and Intrastate War,” Levy
explains the distribution of power in a post-WWII environment and its effects on
conflicts. “The distribution of power, and the nature of that power, is also the primary
explanation for the declining frequency of great-power war over time and in particular
for the great-power peace after World War II” (Levy, 24-5). In other states, though,
there are security concerns that can lead to conflict. These security concerns stem from a
lack of control of power or an abuse of power. “This ethnic security dilemma is
intensified by historical animosities and memories, often exaggerated, of past injuries by
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the other” (Levy, 27). There are many instances of this in recent history including
Rwanda and the SFRY. “These security-driven insecurities can be exacerbated when the
leaders of one group attempt to unify their own people, and to enhance their own
standing among them, by rhetorically exaggerating the potential threat posed by the
other, acting to rectify past injustices (real or imagined), and generally using other
ethnic groups as scapegoats for domestic problems” (Levy, 27-8). This was especially the
case in the conflict in Yugoslavia. An additional consideration is state weakness which
can be a result of ethnic differences or cause the tensions to become worse (Levy, 29). A
final consideration in terms of the distribution of power relates to state borders. “The
lower the congruence between state territorial borders and communal boundaries, the
harder it is to provide security, and the higher the likelihood of violence” (Levy, 28).
These changes have been seen in recent history since the end of World War II, and along
with other conditions, can explain the changing nature of conflict in the world.
Since 1945, the world we live in has become more and more integrated. As the
term globalization suggests, countries and people around the world have become more
“global.” We now have more and more communication devices that did not previously
exist. These devices allow us to be in one part of the world and communicate, even faceto-face, with others from around the world. One of the most evident factors of the
interconnectedness of our world is economic integration. Throughout the years since the
end of WWII, economic integration has increased at an enormous rate. Numerous
examples of economic integration exist: NAFTA, the EU, Mercosur, ASEAN, etc. Aside
from the obvious benefits of reduced trade barriers, these agreements also serve
another, somewhat underlying purpose: to maintain peace and security in the region.
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Looking at the European Union in particular, we see that one of the goals is to make and
maintain continental unity and harmony to prevent disastrous events like WWI and
WWII. While many of these economic arrangements are aimed at trade, they implicitly
foster better relations between the countries involved. While it is by no means a
guarantee of peace and tranquility, these arrangements seem to provide some sort of
peace keeping measures. Some regional economic arrangements, like the EU, also
contain political dimensions as well.
In addition to the EU, there are as number of international organizations that
focus on political integration. Some examples include the United Nations, the Northern
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Arab League, and the AU. Similar to economic
integration arrangements, political arrangements more explicitly seek to maintain peace
and security within a region or between countries. As the Preamble to the UN charter
states:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom…have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.
(Preamble to the United Nations Charter)
Similar organizations which have been created since 1945 aim to ensure that destructive
wars like the ones experienced in the first half of the twentieth century will never
happen again. By bringing these nations together into an organization like the UN, it
allows for communication. While the League of Nations did exist following WWI, it was
not as effective as the UN for a few reasons which are outside of the scope of this paper.
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Although the UN has proven ineffective in a few cases, there has been an overall
decrease in the number of interstate conflicts because the countries are brought together
in an organization which focuses on fostering dialogue in the hopes of avoiding conflict.
A final potential reason for the change in the nature of conflict is the
democratization of most of the world. Looking back in recent history, we see that a
number of interstate conflicts involved nations with differing political ideologies. WWII
involved a conflict between nationalist socialist nations (Italy, Germany, and Japan) and
democratic nations (the UK, France, and the US). The only outlier in this conflict was
the Soviet Union, a communist nation which sided with the Allies until the end of the
war. A sort of tension between the democratic nations and the Soviet Union boiled over
after the end of WWII during the Cold War. During this period there were a number of
conflicts both inter- and intrastate, many of which involved hostilities between
communist and democratic factions. Looking particularly at Vietnam and Korea, the
Soviet Union and the United States were both involved supporting their respective
cohorts.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, much of the world has become democratic.
Late in the 1980s, the communist bloc in Eastern Europe began to collapse as the
government in Moscow struggled to maintain control after implementing reforms. After
a miscommunication in East Germany in 1989, the border between East and West
Berlin was suddenly open. This signaled the beginning of the end for the Soviet
leadership in Moscow. Since then, former communist nations in Eastern Europe have
become democratic nations, with the exception of the SFRY, which “maintained” itself
until 1992/93. Now, the majority of nations in the world are democratic nations, with
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the notable exception of China. As many scholars and researchers have detailed, it is
much less likely that democratic nations would go to war against each other. While this
is far from a guarantee, for the most part it has held true. There is, however, a greater
chance that internal conflict may occur within emerging democracies as rivals seek to
gain power. As Levy explains, “…many new states emerged from the colonial empires
profoundly ill prepared for the tasks of statehood” (30). This can be seen in many
African nations who have struggled to transition from colonial rule to self-rule. “Most
civil wars over the past several decades have taken place within the territory of former
colonial and imperial empires” (Levy, 29).
While violent conflict still occurs, the nature of these conflicts has changed
dramatically since the end of WWII in 1945. The increase in intrastate conflict has
created new problems in third-party intervention and conflict resolution techniques,
especially because internal conflicts have become more and more violent over the years.
In order to understand these problems it is first important to explore potential reasons
for this change in the nature of conflict. I have suggested that these reasons are power
changes, economic integration, political integration, and democratization. Both
economic and political integration serve as a way of increasing interaction between
nations in the hopes of potentially creating deep ties. These ties could foster increased
communication between the nations which would decrease the chances that these
nations would engage in conflict with each other. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the
majority of nations in the world are democratic. In addition to these factors, it is also
important to note that there are now “international norms that discourage both
territorial conquest and secession” (Levy, 29). As many have already noted, democratic
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nations are much less likely to go to war with each other. In some cases, though, a newly
formed democracy can struggle to get going as competitors struggle to maintain or gain
power in the government.
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In order to explore more deeply the issues associated with intrastate conflict
resolution, this paper focuses on two cases studies: Rwanda and Yugoslavia. In order to
analyze these conflicts, I have chosen to use the conflict wheel approach as explained by
Mason and Rychard of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).
Unlike other methods of exploring conflict, this method shows the interconnectedness
of the various pieces of conflict. It also builds logically from one piece of the circle to the
other. The conflict wheel contains 6 divisions: 1. Actors/Relations; 2. Issues; 3.
Dynamics; 4. Context/Structures; 5. Causation; 6. Options/ Strategies. While separate
pieces of the wheel, each part is integral to the others in exploring the conflict.
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The Conflict Wheel

2. Issues
2. Issues

1. Actors/
1. Actors/
Relations
Relations

3. Dynamics
3. Dynamics

Options/
6.6.
Options/
Strategies
Strategies

Context/
4.4.Context/
Structures
Structures

5. Causation
5. Causation

Mason and Rychard define what each of these six parts of the wheel mean to
understanding the various components of a conflict. The Actors/Relations section of the
wheel identifies the parties to a conflict. “If they are directly involved in the conflict they
are called ‘conflict parties’, if they become involved in transforming the conflict, they are
called ‘third-parties’. Stakeholders have an interest in the conflict or its outcome, but are
not directly involved” (Mason). The Issues are what the actors are battling about.
“Dynamics refer to the escalation level of the conflict, the intensity of interaction, the
‘temperament’ and the energy of a conflict that transforms people” (Mason). Context
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and Structures refer to outside influences or causes of the conflict, i.e. poverty, politics,
economic policy. Causes are different from influences in that they are the events, people,
or things that directly lead to a conflict’s beginning or flaring up. Options and Strategies
are those “that are used or could be used, conflict party or third party efforts to deescalate the conflict” (Mason).
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R

wanda: Lessons of an African Genocide

Beginning in 1990, the Rwandan Civil War would see the death of more than 1
million people by its conclusion in 1994. There has been much debate about referring to
these events as a “civil war” or “genocide.” For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to
the “civil war” as the beginning of the conflict with the invasion of the Rwandan
Patriotic Force (RPF) in 1990 and the ensuing Arusha Accords. The actions which took
place in 1994 I will refer to as genocide but also as a continuation of the civil war. While
many nations, including the United States, have officially recognized the events in
Rwanda as genocide, there are many who still refer to it as a part of the civil war which
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began in 1990. By treating the genocide as another continuation of the civil war, one can
better understand the causation of the genocide, while also not taking away from the
gravity of the events of the genocide which alone resulted in the death of almost 1
million people in just 100 days.
1. Actors and Relations
The Rwandan population is composed of two main ethnic groups as well as one
smaller group. The Hutus (also referred to as the Bahutu) are the largest ethnic group In
Rwanda both at the time of the civil war and genocide and today comprising about 85%
of the population. The next largest group are the Tutsi (also referred to as the Batutsi)
who comprise 14% of the population. Finally, the smallest ethnic group in Rwanda are
the Twa which only account for 1% of the Rwandan population
(www.unitedhumanrights.org).
In terms of the conflict itself, the Bahutu were represented by the government in
power, the military, as well as extremist movements including the Hutu Power
Movement which was popular among some of the Bahutu elite. The president of
Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana was a Hutu along with almost all of the other political
elites in government. As will be explained later in this paper, the perceived racial and
ethnic differences between the Bahutu and the other ethnicities were really nonexistent. Hintjens explains that, “In Rwanda, racialist ideologies mainly served as a
mask or pseudo-justification for the more fundamental goal of regime survival under
conditions of sharp socioeconomic crisis and growing political opposition” (242).
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Representing the Bahutu in the genocide were a number of paramilitary and
civilian organized groups. “The largest of these militia groups was the interahamwe,
which literally means ‘those who help one another.’ Until preparation for genocide,
interahamwe were rural self-help work groups, which operated at the level of local
communities” (Hintjens, 268). Once the genocide began, however, the interahamwe
were transformed into death squads.
The Tutsis, a minority ethnic group in Rwanda were the target of the genocide
and the impetus for the beginning of the civil war in 1990. The Tutsi had held political
power in the past and their rule was characterized as “oppressive” by the Bahutu. “The
Hutu remembered past years of oppressive Tutsi rule, and many of them not only
resented but also feared the minority” (www.unitedhumanrights.org). The Batutsi were
represented by the Rwandan Patriotic Force (RPF) which was a rebel group that fought
against the Bahutu government beginning in 1990.
Another important actor in this conflict was the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The UNAMIR was the response of the UN to the civil
war which broke out in Rwanda in 1990. It was “originally established to help
implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by Rwandese parties on 4 August 1993”
(www.un.org). It was implemented in October of 1993, “when Rwanda and Uganda
requested the deployment of military observers along the common border to prevent the
military use of the area by the RPF,” and its mandate ended on 8 March 1996. During
that three year period, the mandate of the mission was adjusted and changed as a
reaction to the subsequent events which took place after the signing of the Arusha
Accords (www.un.org). As we will see, the mission of UNAMIR would become extremely
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important during the genocide and would very much be criticized for its lack of action as
the genocide was taking place.
2. Issues
The main issue in the civil war which began in 1990 was the control of the
government. This power struggle dates back to colonial times where the Belgians pitted
the two against each other. The Batutsi had been expelled from power, but began an
invasion from Uganda in 1990 in an attempt to take political power back from
Habyarimana and the Bahutu. In April of 1994, a plane carrying President Habyarimana
as well as the president of Burundi was shot down as it descended into Kigali. While it is
unknown who actually shot down the plane it is believed to either be the RPF or
potentially Hutu extremists. The extremists were unhappy with Habyarimana and other
government officials because they had negotiated with the Tutsi to “end” the civil war.
This would serve as one of the main issues in the genocide which began shortly after the
death of Habyarimana.
Along with the assassination of President Habyarimana, the Arusha Accords also
served as an impetus for the genocide. Extremist Hutus were not in favor of supporting
the Arusha Accords. Many of these extremists were members of the Hutu Power
movement, and also held higher positions in the government. This was based on the
perceived ethnic differences between the Bahutu and Batutsi. These ethnic differences
were exaggerated by the Hutu Power movement as well as by those in the government to
serve their interest of remaining in power and eliminating the opposition: the Tutsis and
the RPF.
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3. Dynamics
The civil war in Rwanda began in 1990 with the invasion of the RPF from Uganda
which pushed towards the capital, Kigali. Although the RPF was a rebel force with many
fewer troops than the Rwandan army, the RPF fared well and forced the government
into a negotiated settlement. The Arusha Accords were a set of negotiated settlements
between the rebel RPF and the Habyarimana-led Hutu government which had a number
of provisions. One of these provisions included the integration of the RPF and Tutsi
forces into the military and government positions. The Hutus were extremely unwilling
to allow the Tutsi to gain too much power in the government or civil society.
“The Rwandan genocide resulted from the conscious choice of the elite to
promote hatred and fear to keep itself in power” (www.unitedhumanrights.org). The
Hutu-laden government, following the death of Habyarimana, exaggerated the
differences between the Bahutu and Batutsi to increase Bahutu hatred of the Batutsi.
Only by doing this would the Hutus in power be able to “convince” the Hutu majority of
the necessity of disposing of the Tutsi “cockroaches.” The Hutu in government “believed
that the extermination campaign would reinstate the solidarity of the Hutu under their
leadership and help them win the war, or at least improve their chances of negotiating a
favorable peace” (www.unitedhumanrights.org).
According the UNAMIR website, the death of President Habyarimana “set off a
tidal wave of political and ethnic killings” (www.un.org). Among the first to be killed
were the Prime Minister, cabinet ministers and UNAMIR peacekeepers. These people
were seen as traitors to the Hutu majority for negotiating with the RPF and the Tutsi
during the Arusha negotiations. “The killings, targeting Tutsi and moderate Hutus, were

35

mainly carried out by the armed forces, the presidential guard, and the ruling party’s
youth militia, as subsequently confirmed by the Special Rapporteur on Rwanda of the
United Nations HRC (Human Rights Council)” (www.un.org).
The Rwandan military and genocide implementing forces were careful to make
their efforts appear to be a response to the death of Habyarimana or a continuation of
the civil war which began four years earlier. “Killing started in earnest once
international observers (except a small contingent of UNAMIR), and European
journalists, businessmen, clergy, diplomats and aid workers had left Rwanda” (Hintjens,
272). The international community, overall, refused to recognize what was going on in
Rwanda. “One reason there was so little international response was because of the
international indifference and ignorance about the reality of Rwanda’s situation. Those
who planned the genocide did so meticulously, indeed coldly, and lambasted the outside
world with the perceived image of the killings as ‘tribal’” (Hintjens, 274). Unfortunately,
this worked very well with the international media who continued to imply that the
fighting was a result of ethnic tensions. “Domestically, the official line was that the
killings were the result of clashes between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). State propaganda was designed to raise the hackles of
the Bahutu population, and, during the early stages of the genocide, there was little
evidence of overt hostility from Bahutu towards their Batutsi neighbors and relatives”
(Hintjens, 248).
The Hutu in power exercised their force against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu
with brutal efficiency. They made use of the RTLM radio station, which many RPF
troops used to listen as well. The broadcasts on the station “urged on the killings,
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broadcasting the names of Tutsi and opposition targets, and reporting the whereabouts
of those hiding from militias during the genocide…The killing squads (interahamwe)
were thus often able to discover the people who were hidden with relatives or neighbors,
through reports on the radio” (Hintjens, 268). Building off of the obedience of many
Rwandans, the Hutu elite were able to conduct one of the quickest extermination
campaigns in history in which almost 1 million people were killed in a span of only 100
days. “The result was the almost total destruction of social bonds and relations of trust,
and a situation where ‘pupils were killed by their teachers, shop owners by their
customers, neighbor killed neighbor and husbands killed wives in order to save them
from a more terrible death’ (Destexhe 1995: L 31)” (Hintjens, 269).
4. Context and Structure
There were a number of structural influences for both the civil war and the
genocide. While I have explained the immediate causes for the civil war and genocide,
these causes are more overarching and can help to explain both the civil war and
subsequent genocide in 1994. In the late 1980s and 1990s there were a number of
economic, political, and social issues in Rwanda, some of which contributed to the
events of the early 1990s more than others.
The first important context for the conflict is the former colonial rule of the
Belgians. As typical of many colonies in Africa, the Belgians pitted one group against
another. In Rwanda, the Belgians favored the minority Tutsi population over the
majority Hutu population. As a result, the majority Bahutu began to feel unfairly
underrepresented. When the breakdown of colonial power all over African began, the
Belgians withdrew from Rwanda, but left a lasting legacy. Trying to cause issues within
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the newly formed country, the Belgians incited the Hutu to rise up against the Tutsi.
This led to years of ethnic tensions which exploded in 1990.
Economically, Hintjens explains, “the drop in coffee prices in the mid-1980s set
off a period of political extremism and a search for solutions that was to lead to
scapegoating and physical extermination of a large part of the total Rwandan
population” (Hintjens, 242). As the main export of Rwanda, the decline in prices for
coffee served to retard the economic growth of the country. In one year, coffee sales
dropped from 14 billion Rwandan francs to 5 billion, a loss of 9 million francs of revenue
for the country. “External debt soon started to accumulate, and this was almost entirely
due to unfavourable external conditions rather than domestic mismanagement”
(Hintjens, 256).
Around the same time of the RPF invasion from Uganda, programs were
beginning to be implemented from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
“In June 1990, the government finally yielded to World Bank/IMF pressure to
implement a package of structural adjustment measures” (Hintjens, 257). This further
exacerbated the economic conditions in Rwanda by forcing the government to reduce its
debt by cutting programs and taking other regulatory measures. The Bahutu
government refused to act against the implementation of these plans for “feared
financial repercussions” (Hintjens, 258). Instead, the government increasingly blamed
the Batutsi minority and their supporters for the issues that plagued the country. As
Hintjens explains, “Reading between the lines of such political rhetoric, the economic
crisis was being blamed on a conspiracy of traders, merchants and intellectuals,
professionals in which Batutsi tended to specialize” (256-7).
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On the other hand, Rwanda was providing basic needs for its people. “By the
early 1990s, 70 per cent of the population had access to clean drinking water, there was
a good road network in all regions, and local clinics and schools operated in the main
towns of each district” (Hintjens, 256). Compared to other Sub-Saharan African nations,
Rwanda was able to support its population much better than other states. While
boasting this civil success, there were still a number of issues that began to and were
affecting the country.
Leading up to the assassination of Habyarimana and the genocide of 1994,
conditions in Rwanda began to get significantly worse. “In the immediate prelude to the
genocide, there was a dramatic increase in malaria, combined with severe food
shortages and an influx of refugees from Burundi. All these changes dramatically
worsened the lives of most Rwandans” (Hintjens, 257). As a result of the food crisis,
food production rapidly decreased and Rwanda began to import an increasing amount
of food to feed its population. Since coffee prices remained low, the amount that
Rwanda was importing began to steadily surpass the amount that the country was
exporting, eventually surpassing it. “As food imports rose and the currency was
devalued, a trade gap emerged, with export revenue covering barely one third of the
import bill” (Hintjens, 257-8).
The government, in response to the grave economic crisis that was continually
getting worse, began to divert expenses away from human services to the military.
Funding for basic human services dropped and the military began to make immense
gains. “There was also a rapid para-militarisation of Rwandan society, with the creation
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of hundreds of civil defence associations and covert death squads, all dedicated to
fighting the RPF and ‘their allies’ (Human Rights Watch, 1994)” (Hintjens, 257).
Hintjens also explains that the failure to implement many of the terms of the
Arusha Accords led to the events of 1994. One of the terms was an incorporation of the
Batutsi RPF into the Rwandan military force, “but no steps were taken to incorporate
RPF forces into the army” (Hintjens, 258). Instead, the two entities remained
completely separate.
5. Causation
Whereas the causes of the civil war are more general, there seems to be some
direct causes of the genocide which took place in 1994. One of the most immediate
causes of the genocide was the death of Juvenal Habyarimana in April of 1994. As his
plane approached for landing into Kigali, the plane was shot down, killing both
Habyarimana and the Burundian president. While it is not officially known who shot
down the plane, the Hutu in power immediately blamed the Tutsi and moderate Hutu.
Blaming the Tutsi for the death of Habyarimana is a direct result of the ethnic
tensions that had been built up and finally blew open in 1990. Political tensions began to
increase between the Hutu in power and the southern Hutu. “Southerners generally
resented the dominance of a small group of Bahutu northerners in control of the top
echelons of the army and administration, whilst northern Bahutu considered themselves
purer ethnically, and historically less subservient to the Batutsi than the predominantly
‘mixed’ southerners” (Hintjens, 259). (Many Hutu began to marry Tutsi during colonial
and post-colonial times in order to receive the benefits that were afforded to Tutsi but
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not Hutu. As a result, some people, predominately in the south, were of “mixed”
ethnicity even though there are really no large differences between the two groups). The
southern anguish was focused mainly on the akazu. The akazu were “a ‘small house’ of
senior military and civilian officials…centered on the powerful clan of Agathe, the
president’s wife” (Hintjens, 259). This group was determined to remain in power
through the 1990s. Hintjens explains that “by the early 1990s, the akazu members had
come to dominate the most strategic positions both in central ministries and in regional
government. The growing dominance of this small group of Bahutu northerners over
every sphere of Rwandan life came to be deeply resented as the economic recession
deepened, and this led to an upsurge in support for opposition political parties” (259).
The Hutu government incited the Hutu to rise up and kill the inyenzi
(cockroaches). Hintjens explains that it was frighteningly simply to incite the Hutu to
rise against the Tutsi. “Social conformism has sometimes been explained as a legacy of
traditional pre-European Rwandan society, where respect for hierarchy was already
firmly entrenched” (271). This conformity and “tendency for obedience” would become
extremely important in the implementation of the genocide (Hintjens, 271). “When the
orders finally came to kill all Batutsi in Rwanda, and those partly Hutu and with mixed
relatives, most of those called on complied, sometimes with enthusiasm (Uvin 1997:
112). Of the few heroes who resisted, most did not live to tell the tale (Gourevitch 1997:
44-51)” (Hintjens, 271). The government preyed on the fears of the people. They told
the people that “unless the inyenzi (cockroaches) and their allies were defeated once and
for all, the old feudal order could come back to haunt the Rwandan Hutu majority”
(Hintjens, 261).
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6. Options and Strategies
Because of a lack of interest in Rwanda, there was not much that was done to help
the Tutsi who were being massacred at an alarming rate beginning in April of 1994.
UNAMIR efforts were mostly ineffectual at stopping the killings squads. The UN did
enact two resolutions, but both also had little effect. SC Resolution 918 of 1994 “imposed
an arms embargo against Rwanda, called for urgent international action and increased
UNAMIR’s strength to up to 5,500 troops. But it took nearly six months for Member
States to provide troops” (www.un.org). By the time the number of troops deemed
necessary were amassed, more than 800,000 people had been killed.
Again in 1994, the SC (Security Council) passed Resolution 929. This resolution
“authorized, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a multi-national
humanitarian operation. French-led multinational forces carried out ‘Operation
Turquoise’, which established a humanitarian protection zone in south-western
Rwanda. The operation ended in August 1994 and UNAMIR took over in the zone”
(www.un.org). While this was helpful in dealing with the humanitarian crisis that was
left as a result of the genocide, this did little to deter the violence against the Tutsi and
the moderate Hutu while the genocide was taking place.
The Rwandan civil war and genocide ended in July of 1994. At this time “RPF
forces took control of Rwanda… and established a broad-based government”
(www.un.org). Paul Kagame, one of the leaders of the RPF, became the president of
Rwanda. “The new government declared its commitment to the 1993 peace agreement
and assured UNAMIR that it would cooperate on the return of refugees” (www.un.org).
The toll that was left in the wake of the destruction has only recently been recognized.
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Hintjens writes that “the bonds within civil society were completely broken in the
process of organizing this genocide and ensuring its completion in record speed and
with extreme thoroughness” (245). The loss of life was also higher than has been seen
since the end of the Second World War “Including both Hutu and Tutsi deaths, the UN
estimates that between 500,000 and one million people were killed during the
genocide” (Verpoorten, 332). Verpoorten estimates that 77.0% of the Tutsi population in
Rwanda was killed during the genocide (332).
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Y

ugoslavia: The End of a Republic

The breakup of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is a
curious case of a multinational state which seemed to be coexisting within the eastern
European world, but fell into deep chaos and destruction after the fall of the Soviet bloc
in the early 1990s. The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s are by no means simple to
understand or evaluate. This paper will focus on the time period of 1991 until the Dayton
Agreements in 1995. This analysis does not involve the conflict in Kosovo later on in the
1990s. The reason for this is mainly because the conflict up until 1995 is large enough to
handle and explore what I would like to explore in this paper.
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1. Actors and Relations
Since about the end of World War II when the “Iron Curtain” fell upon Eastern
Europe till the 1990s, the SFRY was a sort-of state building model for states seeking to
combine multiple ethnicities into one compatible state. The SFRY contained Serbs,
Bosnians, Croats, Slavs, Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Slovenians, among others. This
was achieved by creating a republic where these ethnicities were roughly represented
within a state, i.e. the Croats had their own state of Croatia. There were, of course,
ethnic minorities that were present in each of the states. On the whole, this SFRY
seemed to be doing well until the late 1980s when things began to turn sour.
When discussing the Yugoslav wars, there are a number of actors to discuss. First
would be the Serbs. The Serbs were mainly based in Serbia, but did have minority
populations in many of the other states within the SFRY. Among the Serbs were those
who were generally more radical than others who served to kindle the fires of conflict.
Many Serb factions in the Yugoslav states were the ones who conducted the military
maneuvers within the states but were aided by the Serbs in Serbia, under the control of
Slobodan Milosevic.
On the other side of the hostilities was the plethora of other ethnic groups in the
SFRY. First, it was the Croats in Croatia following the states secession from the SFRY.
Around the same time, the Slovenians also seceded from the SFRY and were engaged in
some hostilities but were not very much affected by the actions of the Serbs. Another
ethnic group which was very much involved in the hostilities was the Bosnians and the
Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). The Bosnians and Bosniaks were centered in the Bosnia
area which is closer in proximity to Serbia than are Croatia and Slovenia. The inclusion
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of these ethnic groups and their states was a result of the desire of nationalist Serbs to
unite all ethnic Serbs into a single Serbian state, namely Serbia.
2. Issues
There are a number of issues in this conflict, many of which relate back to the
building of the SFRY as a state. “At the heart of the multiple civil wars had always been a
simple question: In which state do the people of Yugoslavia want to live- the SFRY or a
successor state” (Herman, 2007)? This is really the question which led to the secession
of Slovenia and Croatia. It seems as though that by the late 1980s, there was “waning
psychological attachment not only to socialism but to Yugoslavia as well” (Stokes, 139).
The nation that had been created and brought multiple ethnic groups together into a
republic seemed to be crumbling. At the same time, the extremist Serbs wanted to
maintain a strong Serbian state that included all ethnic Serbs. (It is important to note
that not all Serbs were nationalists seeking to unify all Serbs in an ethnically Serb state).
Some have even argued “persuasively that the cause of the breakup was ‘a calculated
attempt to forge a greater Serbia’ and that Milosevic’s packaging of ‘myth, fantasy, halftruths, and brazen lies’ into a nationalistic media blitz poisoned the political
atmosphere, left Serbs with little ability to understand their situation and encouraged
the most radical Serbian elements in Bosnia and Krajina” (Stokes, 145).
In addition to these ethnic disputes, there were a number of internal factors
which led to the destruction of the SFRY. “By 1990 Yugoslavia was plagued with many
problems before its breakup. Foreign debt, inflation, and unemployment created a
troublesome atmosphere. More important were the strong nationalist feelings and
political problems that led to the crisis in Yugoslavia” (Soprych). Another issue which
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played strongly into the decision of Slovenia and Croatia to secede from the SFRY was
the military. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was supposed to represent all of the
ethnicities and people of the SFRY. However, there was a clear Serb majority within the
officer corps which was not acceptable to many of the other ethnic groups within the
SFRY. The Croats and Slovenians were also the major contributors of Yugoslav tax
revenue. “Although less than 30 percent of Yugoslavia’s population lived in Slovenia and
Croatia, they accounted for half of federal tax revenues- before they stopped paying it”
(Herman, 2007). Other contextual issues contributed to the Yugoslav conflict, but those
will be addressed in section four of this analysis.
3. Dynamics
In 1991, Slovenia seceded from the SFRY which set off the “Ten Day War” which
was an offensive by the JNA against the Slovenians. Before this began, the Croats had
already reformed their constitution and held elections with the goal of secession from
the SFRY. Before the Serbs engaged the Slovenians, they had already begun operations
against the Croats. “During the spring negotiations of 1991, guerrillas, aided by
President Milosevic and Serb leaders, invaded every Serb majority district or village in
Croatia and armed villagers who then violently invaded non-Serb majority districts and
villages” (Soprych). The situation was exacerbated by Germany’s recognition of Slovenia
and Croatia as sovereign nations apart from the SFRY. After Germany, many other
nations began to recognize Croatia and Slovenia which only added to the tensions that
already existed.
Shortly thereafter, Serb offensives against the Bosnians in Bosnia-Herzegovina
began. During the period of 1991-1995, the Serbs killed many Bosniaks which some have
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called a genocide. “From the moment in 1992 when Roy Gutman first broke the story of
the Omarska prison camp, the world has known exactly how horrible the war in Bosnia
was. Reporters who rushed to the Bosnian war zone were horrified with the ‘ethnic
cleansing,’ outraged with those who perpetrated it and disgusted with the lack of
effective action by the western powers” (Stokes, 141). Later on, NATO and the United
Nations would become involved in the conflict.
4. Context and Structures
There were a number of “structural” political and economic factors that were not
immediate causes to the Yugoslavian wars, but are nonetheless important to
understanding the conflict. “The Yugoslav economy matched the growth rates of its
Soviet-bloc neighbors and far outstripped them in the quality and availability of
consumer goods” (Stokes, 140). While consumer goods and services and the economy
overall were faring better than its fellow command economies, unemployment was an
issue. “…Unemployment in the social sector rose from 5 percent in 1960 to more than 15
percent in the early 1980s, with regional unemployment skewed from under 3 percent in
Slovenia to over 30 percent in Kosovo” (Stokes, 140). Per capita income in the respective
regions of the SFRY was also very inconsistent. “On a per capita, Slovenia’s income by
the late 1980s was at least twice the average for Yugoslavia as a whole, Croatia’s more
than one-fourth greater, and Serbia proper’s roughly equal to the average. But
Montenegro’s was only 74 percent of Yugoslavia’s average, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 68
percent, Macedonia’s 63 percent, and Kosovo’s 27 percent” (Herman, 2007). The
beginning of this internal economic struggle coincided with the death of the Yugoslav
leader Tito, who many looked towards and favored highly.
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At the same time, there was great pressure on the SFRY economically. “Every
time the Yugoslav government moved to increase employment through foreign
borrowing and investment, it led to an unsustainable import surplus, which in turn led
to calls from the international community to impose austerity measures. The
conditionality imposed by the IMF during the 1980s was just the last manifestation of
this ultimately fatal pressure” (Stokes, 140). As we have seen with Rwanda, external
factors again have lead to internal conflict. With pressure from the international
community, the SFRY was attempting to meet demands but by trying to meet these, they
put many of their people into greater and greater economic disparity, especially in
Kosovo and the more southern portions of the SFRY.
As previously mentioned, the greater majority of Serbs in the JNA served as a
striking point for many of the other ethnic groups. Stokes explains that the JNA was
unable to “maintain its all-Yugoslav orientation” (138). This caused the Slovenians and
Croats to feel unsecure within the framework of the SFRY. Unlike other portions of the
SFRY, Croatia and Slovenia had the available resources to sustain combat against the
JNA and other Serb militants.
5. Causation
Among the various external or structural causes, there are a few immediate
causes of the hostilities in the SFRY. The first would be the actions taken by the
Slovenians, Croats, and Bosnians to secede from Yugoslavia and create their own
nations. The radical Serbs in Serbia would not allow the ethnic Serb minorities in these
newly formed countries to be undermined. Other short-term causes of violence “might
include military factors such as the inability of the JNA to act effectively, the army’s
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willingness to distribute its plentiful arms to local Serbs and the freedom of locals to
bear arms in territorial defense units- and even to import arms separately from the
federal government” (Stokes, 144-5).
The secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1990 sparked the push for the secession
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In October of 1991 “the Bosnian Parliament vote[d] for
independence,” while at the same time, “Bosnian Serbs vote[d] to remain part of the
Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia” (Crocker, 326). Tensions quickly began to rise and in
March of 1992, “Bosnian voters overwhelmingly approve[d] independence, but Bosnian
Serbs boycott the referendum” (Crocker, 326). The recognition of Bosnia as a sovereign
nation in April of 1992 by the European Union as well as the United States set of the
Bosnian War.
As mentioned before, the JNA was supposed to represent the mixture of
ethnicities within the SFRY. Among the officers, Croats and Slovenians were
underrepresented, whereas Serbs had a much greater representation. This led to
tensions among the other ethnic groups who feared that their underrepresentation
could have negative consequences in the long run.
The other immediate issues involve the Serbs willingness to support local Serbs
against their regional governments. By supporting insurgencies, Milosevic and the
nationalist Serbians were able to be in more than one place at once. While they were
focusing attacks in Croatia, they could at the same time arm local Serb forces in Bosnia
and other places who would then engage in attacks against state forces.
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6. Options and Strategies
There were a number of strategies that were taken in this conflict between 1991
and 1995 when the Dayton Agreements were signed. Included in these strategies were
the intervention of a number of organizations and other countries. The UN, NATO and
the United States of America provided the main third-party interventions. In order to
understand these missions, it is important to understand what each of the sides directly
involved in the conflict hoped to gain from continued hostilities. For each side, it is
rather clear what was desired. For the Croats, Slovenians and Bosnians, they desired to
maintain their autonomy which had previously been recognized by a number of states
including Germany. The “radical” Serbs both in Serbia proper and local communities in
other regions or newly formed states wanted to create a pan-Serb state which would
include all ethnic Serbs. When Slovenia and Croatia, and later on Bosnia-Herzegovina,
seceded from the SFRY, they took with them Serb minorities. Serb nationalists took to
arms to liberate these minority populations and reunite them with Serbia. In terms of
the Croatian offensive, it is also interesting to note that with the secession of Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro, Serbia (or the SFRY) would no longer
have direct access to the Adriatic Sea and further the Mediterranean Sea.
The main United Nations intervention took the form of the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which began in February of 1992. “Initially established
in Croatia as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security
required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis” (UNPROFOR
Profile). In its original mission, UNPROFOR set up three “United Nations Protected
Areas” (UNAPs) and ensured that they remained demilitarized and protected the people
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located in those areas. “In the course of 1992, UNPROFOR’s mandate was enlarged to
include monitoring functions in certain other areas of Croatia (‘pink zones’), to enable
the Force to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration
and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers; and to include
monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula and to ensure control of the
Peruca dam, situated in one of the ‘pink zones’” (UNPROFOR Profile). In 1994,
UNPROFOR also oversaw the implementation and keeping of a cease fire that had been
agreed to by the Croatian government and local Serb authorities. This occurred
“following a flare-up of fighting in January and September 1993” (UNPROFOR Profile).
With the escalation of hostilities against the Bosnians and Bosniaks by Bosnian
Serbs and other Serb populations, UNPROFOR again enlarged its mandate. “In
September 1991, UNPROFOR’s mandate was further enlarged to enable it to support
efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian
relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to protect convoys of released civilian
detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requested” (UNPROFOR
Profile). Further operations within Bosnia-Herzegovina were coordinated with NATO to
monitor the no-fly zone which banned “all military flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and the United Nations ‘safe areas’ established by the Security Council around five
Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo” (UNPROFOR Profile). In terms of UN force,
they were authorized to use force in self-defense against aggression towards these
operations.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also very much involved in
the conflict in the former SFRY. “The alliance went to war, by its own account, to protect
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the precarious political stability of the countries of the Balkans” (Mandelbaum, 3).
NATO also took part in the enforcement of the no-fly zone in the region. NATO’s
involvement is almost too simple to explain. With the downfall of the U.S.S.R. in 1990, it
is as if NATO had won the Cold War against the Warsaw Pact. With the SFRY as one of
the few remaining communist countries in Europe at the time, NATO saw a great
opportunity to further eradicate communism from Europe. In addition, NATO had the
military backing that the United Nations would not be able to give, aside from the
peacekeepers that it did send to monitor the conflict.
In addition, the US also sent an envoy to the region to attempt to bring the
parties to negotiation and resolve the conflict in the region, particularly the siege of
Sarajevo. In his article, “The Road to Sarajevo,” Richard Holbrooke details the struggles
that were encountered while attempting to negotiate with the Serbian leaders to come to
a resolution of the conflict in Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia. Holbrooke had traveled
to Bosnia in 1992 while working for the International Rescue Committee and when he
was there realized that Bosnia was a powder keg which was about to explode. After being
recalled to Washington D.C. from his position as Ambassador to Germany, Holbrooke
realized that the situation in Bosnia was only getting worse. “The Bosnian Serbs
continued to ignore internationals mediation efforts and to defy the United Nations. In
the summer of 1995, the worst war crimes committed in Europe since the Holocaustthe massacre of thousands of people whom the Serbs had rounded up- took place at two
Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia that had been designated UN ‘safe areas,’ Srebrenica
and Zepa, while UN peacekeepers stood by helplessly” (Holbrooke, 328).
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Holbrooke was part of a team that was sent to Bosnia to work out agreements
among the Serbs and Bosnians. Holbrooke recounts the numerous meetings that took
place with Milosevic and other Serb leaders while trying to work out an agreement to
resolve the conflict. The team was able to work out an agreement with the Serb and
Bosnian Serb leadership to end the siege of Sarajevo.
At 2:15 on September 14, after more than ten hours of negotiations, the Bosnian
Serbs signed the document, one by one… Two days later, we finally flew into
Sarajevo. Coming into the city from the airport, past overturned buses and
shattered buildings, we drove through streets crowded with pedestrians for the
first time in months. By the times we reached the Presidential offices, several
hundred people had gathered across the street. As we got out of our cars, they
applauded. The siege of Sarajevo was over (Holbrooke, 343).
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A

nalysis

This section will consider the similarities and differences between the Rwandan
and Yugoslavian conflicts. My analysis will focus on the differences and similarities
between the conflicts themselves as well as any third-party intervention and mediation,
if any at all. While these two conflicts occurred simultaneously, it is interesting to note
the differences in the responses of the international community, including international
organizations such as the UN and NATO. An analysis of these conflicts, the third-party
intervention, and mediation efforts will build a foundation for exploring the current
Libyan conflict and suggesting recommendations about how to stop the violence and
end the conflict in that nation. It is my contention that there are a number of things that
have been done correctly but there are also a few things that could be done to resolve the
conflict.
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Similarities and Differences in Conflict
One of the main similarities between the two conflicts is that they were both
identity conflicts. In these cases and others, these ethnic differences can lead to much
more violent actions than interstate conflict (Rothman, 290). In Rwanda, the conflict
occurred, mainly, between the Hutus and Tutsi. There were, however, some Hutus that
were killed because they were seen as too moderate or sympathetic to the Tutsi. In
addition, not only were military troops targeted, but so were civilians, particularly in the
genocide which occurred in 1994. Previously, the RPF, which was predominantly Tutsi,
carried out attacks against the Rwandan military, which was predominately Hutu. Then,
in 1994, everything changed. No longer was it only the military that was involved in the
killing of Tutsi, but also everyday citizens who had become part of Hutu militias carried
out the killings.
In the former SFRY, the main question to be answered was whether the
Croatians, Slovenians, Bosnians, etc. felt psychologically as well as patriotically
connected to the Yugoslav state. The conflict was also based on identities, but there were
a number in the area who were involved in the conflict. This was the result of many of
the ethnic groups feeling under represented and not connected to the Yugoslavian state.
On the one side were the Serbs which also included Bosnian Serbs and Croatian Serbs.
The Serbs in these different areas were armed by the Serbs in Serbia to carry out
conflicts in each of the states in addition to the troop support which came from Serbia.
Croatians, Bosnians, and Bosniaks were the opposing forces in this conflict. As with
Rwanda, in some cases not only were military personnel targeted, but also civilians, as
was seen in the siege of Sarajevo and the Bosnian genocide in Srebrenica later on in
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1995. Because these conflicts were identity-based, many argue that it requires a
different form of intervention, in order to resolve the conflict.
The main difference between the conflicts in Rwanda and Yugoslavia is the
presence of a leader, whether or not this leader is legally elected. In Rwanda, Juvenal
Habyarimana was the legal leader of the nation during the early 1990s part of the civil
strife. Then in 1994, there was a complete absence of leadership following the death of
Habyarimana. This caused a sort of power vacuum in the area, as Hutus in power tried
to gain more control of the government and implement their extermination plan. While
there were a group of Hutu leaders that gave orders to commence the genocide, they
could not really be considered in power of the Rwandan government. Conversely,
Slobodan Milosevic was the clear leader of the SFRY and later Serbia. In addition, there
were leaders of Croatia and Slovenia who were voted into power following the failure of
the referendum which would have changed the SFRY into a loosely tied federation of
states which maintained some autonomy. This, one could argue, had a major impact on
the course of the conflicts. Lacking a single leader, the Hutu militias, military, and
civilians were basically following the orders of a group of Hutu elite who were enacting
their plans. In the SFRY, the military operations could be said to be more controlled
than in Rwanda. This can be attributed to the leadership of Milosevic and the
coordination among Milosevic and the other Serb leaders to carry out their operations.
Similarities and Differences in Third Part Intervention/s
Whereas the Rwandan and Yugoslavian conflicts were somewhat compatible in
comparison of actual conflict, here the two diverge greatly. There were a number of
third-party interveners in the Yugoslavian conflict, but really only one in the Rwandan
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conflict, not counting the efforts of Uganda to gain UN support for actions in the
country. It is important to first explore potential reasons for the lack of intervention in
Rwanda and the “abundance” of intervention in Yugoslavia.
Following the fall of the USSR in 1990/91, the SFRY was one of the only socialist
countries remaining in Europe. As is common with many conflicts involving clashes
between socialism and democracy, much of the western world had a vested interest in
the fall of the SFRY and the creation of separate democratic states. In addition the
proximity of Yugoslavia and its successor states on the European continent (and to the
western democracies) only furthered the impetus for these nations and organizations to
intervene in their backyard. Whether or not the secession of the successor states was
legal, the US and other western democracies seemed determined to ensure that
communism would be eradicated in Europe and elsewhere. Since the communist bloc
had all but eroded away with the fall of the USSR, the SFRY served as one of the final
impediments to a democratized European continent.
Rwanda, on the other hand, is not in Europe’s backyard. It is in fact thousands of
miles away on a separate continent that, at times, it seems many forget exist. It is also a
smaller nation on the continent with a current population of only around eleven million
people. Many of the conflicts that have arisen on the continent have also been viewed as
tribal. Many countries that could potentially intervene do not feel obligated to intervene
once a conflict can be termed “tribal.” It is assumed that the conflict dates back further
than necessary to understand and that it is something that will most likely continue.
Because of the long history of colonization of the continent, countries other than the
former colonial power are even more hesitant to intervene. As will be seen of the UN
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force that was sent to Rwanda, the majority of the forces came from Belgium, Rwanda’s
former colonial ruler.
United Nations Intervention
In both cases, the UN intervened in the conflict, but accomplished (or in some
cases did not accomplish) very different things. In order for the United Nations to
become involved in intrastate conflict, a number of things must first happen. Unlike
interstate conflict, which the UN has jurisdiction over and can intervene in provided
that both nations are Member States, the UN cannot automatically intervene militarily
in an internal conflict. With resolutions of the Security Council (SC), the UN can take
humanitarian actions or other “pacific” measures such as economic sanctions against a
country in civil strife. Article 39 of the Charter states: “The Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security” (Charter of the United Nations). In order for the UN to intervene militarily in
an internal conflict, though, the state must request the support because the UN cannot
or will not infringe upon national sovereignty. Only then can the Security Council even
vote on possible resolutions containing military actions. One of the only exceptions to
this is if the United Nations determines that genocide is taking place. Then, under the
Convention against Genocide, nations are required to act to end and further punish the
actions and actors.
As mentioned, the UN became involved in the Rwandan conflict following the
implementation of the Arusha Accords with the UNAMIR mission, “to assist in assuring
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the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including
establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures;
monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government’s
mandate leading up to elections, assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the
coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations”
(UNAMIR Mandate). Gen. Romeo Dalliere was selected as the commander of the
mission and led a contingent of UN forces which were composed of mostly Belgian
troops along with troops contributed by other nations. For Dalliere and his men, viewing
the situation in Rwanda was in the words of Dalliere, like “watching a fuse burn to a
powder keg” (Shake Hands with the Devil). Tensions still remained very high in the
country following the Accords with many in the Hutu Power movement who were
completely unwilling to accept the agreements. When Habyarimana was killed, the
violence in Rwanda resumed.
When the violence resumed, the UN could do nothing but watch because their
mandate did not include military action. UN forces could only evacuate foreign
nationals living in the country and maintain the headquarters in Kigali they had been
allocated to oversee by the Accords. Dalliere recounts that some nations would send up
to 25,000 troops for the sole purpose of removing and saving expatriates, but they didn’t
want to help the Rwandans who were being killed at an alarming rate. In addition, the
presence of many Belgian troops proved to be an issue. Many Rwandans would kill the
Belgian soldiers as a form of revenge for colonial rule. This persuaded many of the
nations who had sent military forces to remove them, especially Belgium. Dalliere
continually asked for more support in order to try and help the Rwandans who were
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being murdered, but the troops never came. Once the Belgians removed their forces
from the country, Dalliere was left with only 300 men. As Carment and Rowlands
explain, “humanitarian action cannot substitute for political action,” and this is certainly
the case in Rwanda (74). While some nations have officially called the events in Rwanda
genocide, others have not. Since many of these nations did so after the events had
occurred, there was no requirement for nations to intervene. Instead many nations did
not send the support that was requested.
In Yugoslavia, the United Nations became involved in February 1992 in an effort
to end the hostilities of the Yugoslav crisis. “UNPROFOR's mandate was to ensure that
the three ‘United Nations Protected Areas’ (UNPAs) in Croatia were demilitarized and
that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack”
(UNPROFOR Profile). Unlike UNAMIR, UNPROFOR’s mandate was expanded with the
escalation and expansion in violence. Not only were operations in Croatia expanded, but
UNPROFOR’s mission was also expanded to include Bosnia and Herzegovina. “In June
1992, as the conflict intensified and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's
mandate and strength were enlarged in order to ensure the security and functioning of
the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to that city and its
environs” (UPROFOR Profile). UNPROFOR forces were also enabled to protect
humanitarian convoys in and out of the region and were also a part of enforcing the “nofly zone” along with NATO. Forces were permitted not only to defend themselves against
attacks, but also assist NATO in air power. Overall, the UN mission in the SFRY was far
more extensive and encompassing than was the UN mission in Rwanda. Not only were
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UN forces aiding the humanitarian assistance, but they were also engaged in the
military actions in the area.
Other Interventions
As mentioned a previous section, there were mediation efforts made by a team
from the United States of America, which Richard Holbrook was a part of. This team
operated from Croatia and made trips into and out of Bosnia attempting to negotiate the
end of the siege of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The team met a number of times with
Milosevic while gradually trying to pressure the Serbians to stand down and end the
siege. At the same time, NATO was engaged in a bombing campaign and was also
enforcing a no-fly zone in the area. Holbrooke attributes some of their success with
Milosevic and the other Serbs to the use of force by NATO. He recounts leaving the
negotiations after reaching a settlement and being approach by Radovan Karadzic, the
“president” of the Bosnian-Serbs. “We got up to leave, carrying the precious original
with us. Karadzic grabbed my hand. ‘We are ready for peace,’ he said, in English. ‘Why
did you bomb us’” (Holbrooke, 343)? The answer, Holbrooke implicitly explains, was
because of the atrocities the Bosnian-Serbs had committed against the Bosniaks and
Bosnians at Srebrenica.
Analysis of Third-Party Intervention/s
It is clear that there were far more efforts at intervention in Yugoslavia as
opposed to Rwanda. As I mentioned earlier, there are a few possible explanations for
this, but this section will focus mainly on the effectiveness of the interventions and what
more could have possibly be done, or what could have been done better. While it is clear
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that more could have been done in Rwanda. Whether or not more could have been done
or done better in the case of Yugoslavia is much harder to examine because there were
already a number of interventions. This analysis will form the basis for my comments
about what has already been done in Libya and what could possibly be done.
Considering that the conflict in the former SFRY re-ignited following the Dayton
Accords of 1995, it is obvious that the third-party interventions did not fulfill their
intended purpose. With ethnic conflicts, it is important to address the real underlying
issues. As Rothman and Olsen explain, “a tragic example of [not addressing the
underlying issues in the conflict] is the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, where the Bosnian
conflict was ‘settled’ only to persist and re-emerge with renewed virulence in Kosovo a
couple of years later” (290). While the multitude of interventions from the UN, NATO,
the US mission, and others were able to end the hostilities with the Dayton Accords,
they were unable to implement institutions and reforms to make sure that the conflict
would not break out again in the region. Rothman and Olsen argue that since the
conflict re-emerged, the “true source [of the conflict] has not been adequately
articulated and engaged first” (296). This begs the question, what could have been done
better?
I would suggest that a few things could have been done in the case of the
Yugoslavian conflict so that the conflict did not resume shortly after the agreements. In
this case, it seems that the Dayton Accords were used in what Arnault calls the
“constitutive” view. This “views the substance of the peace agreement as key to the
overall process, which will reflect its strength and weaknesses, virtues and
shortcomings” (1). It seems that the Accords might have been better used in the
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“instrumental” view where the agreement is not seen as the most vital piece of the
resolution puzzle. It instead sees the agreement as “but one of the many stages in a
complex transition. It should therefore not be made to bear alone the burden of the
entire process” (Arnault, 1). Implementation of instrumental agreements can be
adjusted to reflect the situation on the ground whereas constitutive agreements are not
as flexible. Arnault argues that instrumental agreements “should promote a process of
gradual accommodation between the peace agreement and realities on the ground,
which is the only path towards a lasting peace” (2). In this case, it could have been
adjusted to reflect the continued animosity which existed between Bosnians and
Bosnian-Serbs so that changes in the region could be countered.
In terms of the Arusha Accords, it appears that many hoped that it would serve as
a permanent end to the conflict. But from the observations of Gen. Dalliere, it appears it
was difficult to implement and maintain many of the terms of the Accords. Again, the
Arusha Accords could have been used in the “instrumental” manner, but were not. The
UN mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), which focused on the implementation of the Arusha
Accords, was never re-evaluated given the stark changes that were occurring on the
ground in Rwanda. The additional support which Gen. Dalliere requested could and
should have been provided by the UN member nations to adequately handle the
situation on the ground. Although the Arusha Accords were agreed upon, it is clear that
there were still some in the country that were unhappy with the agreement, particularly
the radical Hutu, some of who were in powerful positions in the Rwandan government.
There are a number of things that could have been done in Rwanda to either
prevent the subsequent genocide or even end it sooner once it had begun. To begin, the
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UN could have altered UNAMIR’s mandate as the situation began to change on the
ground. As mentioned, the Arusha Accords could have been used in an instrumental
manner which allowed for situational changes on the ground. In addition, the Arusha
Accords could have done a better job at addressing the underlying ethnic issues that
were present in the country (some would argue that these issues still exist to this day as
well with the recent developments in the country in terms of elections). One of the main
things I feel could have been done to resolve the conflict in Rwanda is mediation.
Zartman and Touval define mediation as “a form of third-party intervention in a
conflict. It differs from other forms of third-party intervention in conflict in that it is not
based on the direct use of force and it is not aimed at helping one of the participants
win” (437). Mediation is beneficial because the mediator can make suggestions, but they
are not judicially binding on the parties (Zartman, 437). The mediation is really
propelled by the parties involved and what they hope to gain from the conflict. “Their
intervention as mediators is legitimized by the goal of conflict reduction, which they
typically proclaim” (Zartman, 438). The authors describe three modes of mediation that
can be effective to resolving a conflict. The first sees the mediator’s role as a
communicator. This occurs “when conflict has made direct contact between parties
impossible, thereby preventing the parties from talking to each other and from making
concessions without appearing weak or losing face” (Zartman, 446). As a communicator,
the mediator’s role is simply to convey messages between the parties that would
otherwise not be transmitted. “This role is completely procedural, with no substantive
contribution by the mediator, and in its simplest form it is completely passive, only
carrying out the parties’ orders for the delivery of messages” (Zartman, 446). The second
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mediation role is the formulation role. This “requires the mediator to enter into the
substance of the negotiation” (Zartman, 446). Mediators have a vision for how the
conflict could be resolved and “provide a common understanding of the problem…or a
shared notion of justice to govern an outcome” (Zartman, 446). The final role of a
mediator is the “manipulation” role. This role involves “the maximum degree of
involvement, requiring the mediator to become a party to the solution if not the dispute”
(Zartman, 446). Each of these three roles depends significantly in the mediator’s power
in the negotiation, or leverage.
Mediation pre-Arusha Accords could have led to agreements where all radical
Hutus were removed from power so that the genocide might never have occurred. More
efforts could have been made to ensure the Tutsi were fairly represented in the
government, and that the RPF were integrated into the standing military. Instead, the
UN mainly ensured that the area they controlled was secure. The UN could have been
more effective by offering mediation services in the form of good offices. Good offices
involve providing a place for two parties to meet in order to determine what is needed
for an agreement, assuming an agreement is reachable. “UN good offices will involve
providing the parties with a diagnosis of the nature of the problem; assisting them in
establishing more realistic benchmarks for implementation; and at the same time,
usually, more detailed procedures to monitor compliance” (Arnault, 6-7). Since ethnic
conflicts provided added hurdles to resolution, mediation is a good tool to utilize
because it can address these multiple issues, as well as hit at the root issues.
As seen from the preceding analysis, these two conflicts, while both ethnic, civil
conflicts occurred in much different manner and were handled in different ways as well.
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While there was more intervention in the SFRY than there was in Yugoslavia, both
conflicts were reignited following agreements. The Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi and
moderate Hutu occurred after the Arusha Accords were reached, and the continued war
in Kosovo occurred after the Dayton Accords were signed. While the measures I have
suggested are by no means guarantees that the conflicts would have been resolved, it is
possible that they may have done more to ensure the conflicts did not re-emerge after
agreements had already been reached. Both conflicts do point to the fact that there
needs to be a new focus on intrastate conflicts which are based on identity struggles.
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L

ibya: A Fight for Democracy or Tribal War?

The current crisis in Libya provides an interesting application of intrastate
conflict resolution given the recent developments in the region. With the revolutions in
Tunisia, Egypt, as well as other nations in the region, many believed the uprising in
Libya would also be non-violent. Protests in the country began in February of 2011, but
violence quickly began to take hold of the region when, “on Feb. 27, security forces loyal
to Colonel Qaddafi used gunfire to try to disperse thousands of protestors who streamed
out of mosques after prayers to mount their first major challenge to the government’s
crackdown in Tripoli” (“Libya- Protests and Revolt”). Since then, the country has been
thrown into civil unrest with forces loyal to Qaddafi attacking rebel forces and vice
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versa. Since February, the conflict has swayed back and forth with the rebels seemingly
on the brink of victory until Qaddafi’s forces mount a comeback to drive the rebels back
to their stronghold in Benghazi. There have also been a number of third-party
interventions seeking to end the violence in the country. Most notably are the efforts of
the African Union (AU), the EU, the UN, and NATO. The actions of these interveners
have varied from military intervention to mediation efforts. While the conflict is still
ongoing, whatever way the conflict is finally resolved will have a large impact on the
future not only of Libya but the future of intrastate conflict resolution.
With the outbreak of violence against the citizens of the Libya, the United
Nations was called into action. “The United Nations Security Council voted unanimously
to impose sanctions on Colonel Qaddafi and his inner circle of advisors, and called for
an international war crimes investigation into ‘widespread and systemic’ attacks against
Libyan citizens” (“Libya- Protest and Revolt”). This vote took place on 26 February as
Qaddafi began to further crackdown on Libyans in revolt. Later, on 17 March, “the
Security Council authorized member nations to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect
civilians, diplomatic code words calling for military action” (“Libya- Protest and
Revolt”). It had been debated among Western allies whether or not to directly arm the
rebel forces in Libya which could create problems after the conflict (if the conflict does
in fact end with a rebel victory). Instead, military action against Qaddafi forces and
instillations began almost immediately, on 19 March, and were led by British, French,
and American forces. “Within a week allied air strikes had averted a rout by Colonel
Qaddafi of Benghazi and established a no-fly zone over Libya” (“Libya- Protest and
Revolt”).
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NATO has also been involved in the conflict supporting and leading military
actions in the area. While the US had been leading the offensives against Qaddafi’s
forces, President Obama chose to hand over the leading role to NATO forces. Recently,
however, NATO leaders have become weary of committing military support, including
the imposition of a no-fly-zone. In recent days, NATO leaders have met to discuss the
future of military action and what the ends of their military campaign are. Until this
point, many leaders were not aware of what the end solution would be beyond enforcing
the UN mandate to protect Libyan citizens. “Meanwhile, the American military warned
that the insurgents’ rapid advances could quickly be reversed without continued
coalition air support” (Libya- Protest and Revolt”). It appears, at this point, the conflict
may have stalled a bit with the rebels having been driven back by Qaddafi forces. On 14
April, “NATO foreign ministers gathered to wrestle with increasingly complex questions
raised by the stalled conflict in Libya, seeking a formula for political progress in the
absence of any decisive military gains” (“Libya- Protest and Revolt”).
The most recent attempts at intervention have come from the African Union.
Member of the AU have formed a mediation team who have been dispatched to the
region to attempt to bring an end to the violence. The mediation team is made up of the
heads of state of Mauritania, Mali, and the Congo and foreign ministers from Uganda
and South Africa (“African Mediators”). There have since been numerous reports about
the willingness of both the Qaddafi government and rebel forces to agree to mediation
efforts. The Libyan government seems ready to engage in mediation, while the rebel
forces appear to have refused AU mediation efforts (“Libyan Rebels”). As the New York
Times reports, “African Union negotiators faced a chilly reception upon arriving in
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eastern Libya to try brokering a cease-fire with Libyan rebels” (“Libya- Protest and
Revolt”).
In attempting to determine what should be done in Libya, there are a number of
things to consider. Probably the most important is to determine whether or not the
current conflict in Libya is actually a fight for democracy, or a tribal war. In his article,
Kirkpatrick questions what would come next if Qaddafi was removed from power in
Libya. “The question has hovered over the Libyan uprising from the moment the first
tank commander defected to join his cousins protesting in the streets of Benghazi: Is the
battle for Libya the clash of a brutal dictator against a democratic opposition, or is it
fundamentally a tribal civil war” (Kirkpatrick, 1)? The Western allies are hoping it is a
fight for democracy and that the military intervention, along with other interventions,
will end with Qaddafi being removed from power. Qaddafi, on the other hand, sees the
conflict as a tribal war. “…The revolt is a tribal war of eastern Libya against the west that
ends in either his triumph of a prolonged period of chaos” (Kirkpatrick, 1).
Kirkpatrick explains that, like the Qaddafi government, the rebel “government” is
very much connected and based on familial ties. Prior to 1969 when Qaddafi came to
power, the country was split into three regions each of which contained a number of
tribes. “Retaliatory tribal killings and violence were the main source of justice”
(Kirkpatrick, 1). Qaddafi has many times played off of the animosity and violent-prone
tribes to fight wars against other tribes or against neighboring countries. Generally, the
tribes in the east of the country have traditionally been rebellious because they were
favored by the last king, Idriss I, who was overthrown by Qaddafi. Qaddafi, “in turn
favored the tribes of the central and western coast” (Kirkpatrick, 1).
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It is also possible that the conflict is actually a fight for democracy, thanks in part
to the reforms instituted by Qaddafi to modernize the country. “Coming to power just
before the oil boom, he tapped Libya’s new wealth to provide schools, hospitals and
other benefits for Libya’s desperately poor, semi-nomadic population” (Kirkpatrick, 2).
Whereas people used to live nomadically with their tribes, almost 85 percent of the
country’s population has moved to the cities where they now live with other tribes.
“Many from eastern tribes now live in western Tripoli, and tens of thousands of
members of the predominantly western tribes, Warfalla and Tarhuna, which form the
core of Colonel Qaddafi’s support, now live in Benghazi” (Kirkpatrick, 2). In addition,
education has increased in the country as many have studied around the world. “Libyan
officials say that 12,000 Libyans now receive government scholarships to study abroad
each year and about another 12,000 pay their own way to do the same” (Kirkpatrick, 2).
When or how the conflict in Libya will be resolved remains to be seen. At this
point it seems the conflict is at a standstill with the rebel forces having been driven back
to the east with Qaddafi forces pushing forward. There have already been a number of
interventions from the EU, the UN, NATO, and the AU. The UN has sanctioned military
action to protect the citizens of Libya and NATO (and the United States) has led the way
in enforcing the no-fly-zone and “aiding” the rebels against Qaddafi forces. How the
conflict will be resolved is dependent on how the conflict is viewed. If it is seen as a fight
for democracy, Western allies will continue to support the rebels in their struggle
against Qaddafi forces. If more and more nations begin to see the conflict as tribal, we
may see a drop off of support for the rebels. As was seen in Rwanda, third-party
interveners are somewhat weary of intervening in tribal conflicts. In my opinion, the
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best chance of ending the conflict would be African Union mediation. While the rebels
do not believe the AU can enforce whatever agreements may be reached, it is vitally
important for the UN and western nations to back any agreements reached through the
AU. With UN, EU, and NATO backing, it will most likely allow the rebels to feel more
comfortable engaging with the Qaddafi government and the AU in mediation
discussions. There is, however, a caveat. It does seem that Qaddafi is set on maintaining
power, even in the face of many western nations claiming it is necessary for him to step
down, including President Obama. Either way, there are a number of questions
surrounding the resolution of the conflict in Libya. Will Qaddafi ever step down? Would
he accept a power-sharing arrangement, or a new government? Can democracy work in
the nation? What will happen if military attacks continue and Qaddafi steps down? Will
the nation be able to recover and set up a new government? These and other questions
are vitally important and will only be answered in time. For now, I would argue that the
interventions are at a very important cross-road and will need to decide on an end
solution to works towards. So long as Qaddafi is harming innocent civilians, we can
expect third-party military intervention in addition to non-violent intervention from the
AU.
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Update
Since this paper was written, much has occurred in Libya. After months of what
appeared to be a stalemate, the rebel forces made a strong push westward towards
Tripoli. With the aid of NATO forces, the rebel forces eventually captured Tripoli, setting
up a new government, the National Transition Council (NRC). The NRC became the
officially recognized government in Libya in August, ending the 42 year reign of
Muammar Gaddafi. The ousted leader was forced to flee from Tripoli to his hometown
of Sirte. It is here that Gaddafi and forces loyal to him made their final stand against the
rebel forces. The rebel forces continued to attack areas loyal to Gaddafi until 20 October
2011, when Gaddafi was found and killed.
NATO and other third-party interveners played a large role in the progression of
the conflict in Libya. Non-violent interventions were offered by both the UN and African
Union (AU). While Gaddafi forces were attacking rebel strong-holds, “the UN moved
food supplies into western Libya through a humanitarian corridor” (“Libya: The Fall of
Gaddafi”). On the military side, NATO came to be the leading intervening force. With
the US turning over control of the Libya mission to NATO, the organization became the
focal point of military assistance in the country. NATO continued to aid the rebels in
their apparent fight for democracy, providing necessary air supremacy and logistical
support, without which the rebels’ effort might have ended in harsh defeat. Instead, the
rebels achieved victory in their struggle to topple the Gaddafi regime.
The original prediction offered by this paper has since proven to be incorrect. It
was anticipated that the non-violent intervention attempts by the AU would result in an
end to the conflict. At that time, the rebels and Gaddafi forces appeared to be at a
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stalemate, and whether or not the conflict was truly a fight for democracy or a tribal war
was still to be determined. As time progressed, NATO became more involved, providing
critical air strikes which many believe were of vital importance to the eventual rebel
victory. It is also important to note that this was the first uprising in the so-called Arab
Spring to become a full-fledged war. Other uprisings in the area ended with the leader
being deposed, but not killed, and little military action was taken either on the side of
the resistance or of the government in power. In Libya we have the first instance of
militia groups fighting against military units of the country. It was also the first instance
in which third party interveners became involved militarily in the uprising.
Taken together, the events of the Arab Spring, including the current situation in
Syria, have proven to be a large question mark in terms of third party intervention. In an
area where the West is not viewed with high esteem, western powers have struggled to
determine exactly what to do with each individual uprising aside from speeches
denouncing tyrants and dictators and calling for leaders to step down. Perhaps more
interesting is the specific case of Libya. Here, we have the first instance in the Arab
Spring of distinct military action being taken by militias as well as governmental forces.
It appears as though it was much easier for potential outside interveners to make
decisions when there was an actual war taking place. The UN and the AU were both
forced into action, as was NATO. Moving forward it will be interesting to see what will
happen in Syria should the violence there continue to escalate.
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C

onclusion

As long as there are ethnic tensions, challenges to government authorities, and
questions of legitimacy, there will continue to be internal conflicts. Some, like Egypt and
Tunisia, may be non-violent, while others, like Rwandan, Yugoslavia, and Libya, will be.
Unlike interstate conflicts, intrastate conflicts provide a multitude of challenges to
intervention and conflict resolution. Whereas before World War II, it appears that
interstate conflicts were the prevalent form of conflict, now intrastate conflicts seem to
occur more often.
This paper began with an explanation of the changes in conflict since the end of
World War II. While there have been a multitude of changes to the international
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landscape, many of these changes relate back to the increasing interconnectedness of
our world. I detailed four trends which have led to the change in the nature of conflict.
First is the distribution of power. Whereas in the past “great powers” were the main
parties involved in conflict, today, there is less great power conflict. However, in nations
where there are questions about who holds or who should hold power conflicts are much
more likely. Second is economic integration. Like political integration, economic
integration focuses on bringing states together in conversation. Like the UN and EU,
many of these economic and political organizations seek to maintain peace and security
both regionally and throughout the world. A final reason for the changing nature of
conflict is democratization. It has been widely established that democracies do not
generally go to war against each other just by the nature of the government structure.
Since the end of World War II, most of the world, with the notable exception of China,
has become democratized.
In order to explore the conflicts in Rwandan and Yugoslavia, I chose to use the
conflict wheel approach which breaks down a conflict into six sections. I chose this
approach because it shows that while there are different things that make up a conflict,
they are all connected to each other and all come together to create the situations in the
conflict. The wheel is divided into six sections: Actors/Relations, Issues, Dynamics,
Context/Structures, Causation, and Options/Strategies.
The Rwandan and Yugoslavian case studies provide good basis for analysis of
intrastate conflicts themselves as well as third-party interventions. In Rwanda, the civil
war between the Hutu and Tutsi, which originally ended with the Arusha Accords, but
reignited following the assassination of Juvenal Habyarimana, shows a case where there
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was not much intervention and the devastating effects it can have. Following the
realization of the mass extermination during the Holocaust, the world vowed never
again to allow genocide to occur, but the world has failed in its mission thus far,
including Rwanda and Yugoslavia. The conflict in the former SFRY contrasts the
Rwandan conflict in that there was much more intervention by third parties, including
interventions from the UN, NATO, and private missions of the United States. Although I
focused mainly on the events leading up to the Dayton Accords, the conflict in Bosnia
and Kosovo did re-ignite following the agreement.
It is my contention that the world can learn a lot about intrastate conflict
resolution from these two cases. On the one hand, we have a situation where almost one
million people were killed as the world stood by and did not take action (Rwanda), and
on the other hand, a case that very much involved the actions of third-parties, but still
re-ignited following agreements (SFRY). In addition, these two conflicts illustrate the
violence and hatred that can be associated with ethnic conflicts. It also points to a need
for new techniques in resolving ethnic conflicts because they are so violent and deadly.
Somewhere in the comparison between these two conflicts, we can see the potential
value of mediation as that alternate form of conflict resolution. As a form of
intervention, mediation generally does not involve military action, but does sometimes
involve the parties coming together to establish what they hope to gain from continued
fighting (unless the mediator is acting as a transmitter, in which case the parties are
communication, just not directly).
Finally, this paper discussed the current on-going conflict in Libya between forces
loyal to Colonel Qaddafi and the rebel forces. This case presents a number of issues and
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also a number of interventions by the EU, the UN, NATO, and the AU. These
interventions have ranged from military interventions by UN members (mostly Western
allies) and NATO, to attempts at non-violent resolution by the African Union. While it is
still unclear how the conflict will end and what will happen after the conflict is resolved,
today the conflict appears to be at a standstill militarily with the rebels having been
driven back to the east after pushing westward to Tripoli. There are a number of factors
that need to be considered before this conflict will be resolved, and we will only see in
time what the outcome will be.
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